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flatfish
10-31-2006, 03:35 PM
Subject: APHIS BSE Ongoing Surveillance Program update October 31, 2006



Date: October 31, 2006 at 12:14 pm PST
BSE Ongoing Surveillance Program
Monthly Test Results

APHIS reports ongoing surveillance totals monthly.

The BSE ongoing surveillance program will sample approximately 40,000 animals each year. Under the program, USDA will continue to collect samples from a variety of sites and from the cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be detected, similar to the enhanced surveillance program procedures.

BSE Ongoing Surveillance Program Cumulative Total
From Sep 1, 2006: 1 ,792

Month Number of Tests
Sep 2006
1,792




http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml





**** at this rate they will not even find the infamous spontaneous BSE/TSE in the USDA bovine.

of course, we know the spontaneous TSE is only wishful thinking (please see Chesebro et al at bottom on spontaneous TSE).

daaaaa...............problem solved. i can't believe this is happening. ...TSS




Release No. 0255.06
Contact:
Ed Loyd (202) 720-4623
Karen Eggert (202) 690-4755


USDA ANNOUNCES NEW BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

WASHINGTON, July 20, 2006-Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns announced today that the U.S. Department of Agriculture will soon begin transitioning to an ongoing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) surveillance program that corresponds to the extremely low prevalence of the disease in the U.S.

"It's time that our surveillance efforts reflect what we now know is a very, very low level of BSE in the United States," said Johanns. "This ongoing surveillance program will maintain our ability to detect BSE, provide assurance that our interlocking safeguards are successfully preventing BSE, while continuing to exceed science-based international guidelines."

The ongoing BSE surveillance program will sample approximately 40,000 animals each year. Under the program, USDA will continue to collect samples from a variety of sites and from the cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be detected, similar to the enhanced surveillance program procedures.

The new program will not only comply with the science-based international guidelines set forth by the World Animal Health organization (OIE), it will provide testing at a level ten times higher than the OIE recommended level.

USDA has an obligation to provide 30 days notice of the change to contractors who are performing the sampling and testing, so the earliest the new surveillance program would begin is late August. Once the ongoing surveillance program begins, USDA will periodically analyze the surveillance strategy to ensure the program provides the foundation for market confidence in the safety of U.S. cattle.

In April, USDA released an analysis of 7 years of BSE surveillance data. This included data from an enhanced surveillance program, which began in June 2004, as a one-time effort to determine the prevalence of BSE in the United States. The analysis concluded that the prevalence of BSE in the United States is less than 1 case per million adult cattle. The analysis further revealed that the most likely number of cases is between 4 and 7 infected animals out of 42 million adult cattle. The analysis was submitted to a peer review process and a panel of outside experts affirmed the conclusions.

The enhanced surveillance program has been funded using emergency CCC funds totaling $157.8 million since June 2004. Ongoing surveillance will cost approximate $17 million per year using funds appropriated by Congress. The President's FY 2007 budget request includes this level of funding.

BSE surveillance is not a food safety program. Human and animal health is protected by a system of interlocking safeguards, including the removal of specified risk materials - those tissues that studies have demonstrated may contain the BSE agent in infected cattle, along with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ruminant to ruminant feed ban. Scientific studies indicate that the longer a feed ban is in place, the lower the prevalence of BSE will become.

An outline of the ongoing BSE surveillance plan is available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse.shtml.



http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2006/07/0255.xml






CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006


The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier
this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to
them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest
case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at
least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA
officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a
picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is
thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they
consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal,
incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated
with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the
National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System
Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press
International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer
that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before
one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow
that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end


http://www.upi.com/


CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ...
Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central
Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room
4A-05, ...


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm




US SENATOR AND STAN THE MAN SLAM USDA ''DAMNING TESTIMONY''

Senator Michael Machado from California

''USDA does not know what's going on''.
''USDA is protecting the industry''.
''SHOULD the state of California step in''

Stanley Prusiner

''nobody has ever ask us to comment''

''they don't want us to comment''

''they never ask''

i tried to see Venemon, after Candian cow was discovered with BSE.
went to see lyle. after talking with him... absolute ignorance... then
thought i should see Venemon... it was clear his entire policy was to get cattle
bonless beef prods across the border... nothing else mattered...
his aids confirmed this... 5 times i tried to see Venemon, never worked...
eventually met with carl rove the political... he is the one that arranged meeting
with Venemon... just trying to give you a sense of the distance... healh public safety...
was never contacted... yes i believe that prions are bad to eat and you can die from them...

END


Dr. Stan bashing Ann Veneman - 3 minutes


*** YOU MUST WATCH THIS! ...TSS

http://maddeer.org****eo/embedded/08snip.ram



continued...

flatfish
10-31-2006, 03:36 PM
PAUL BROWN M.D.


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf



9 December 2005
Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)

SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION
James J. Kramer, Ph.D.
Vice President, Corporate Operations


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf




Embassy of Japan


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02N-0273-EC240.htm




Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005
2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of
Platelets
by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ...


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm





03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.
Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12.


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf




03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2.
Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8.


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf




Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov Subject: [Docket
No. 03-025IFA]
FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ...


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf



03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF]
... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al
[Docket No. 03-
025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and
...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf




http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Search/Search_Results/Index.asp?q=03-025IF&mode=simple&num=10&as_occt=any&restrict=FSIS_DOCKET_COMMENTS





In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF]
Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone:
732-741-2290
Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf





Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF]
... Page 1 of 17 From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] Sent:
Thursday,
September 08, 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov
Subject ...


www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf




http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf





03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-618 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-618.pdf




03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford [PDF]
Page 1. 03-038IF 03-038IF-15 Richard L. Crawford
Page 2. Page 3. Page 4.


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-038IF/03-038IF-15.pdf




continued...

flatfish
10-31-2006, 03:39 PM
Science 24 September 2004:
Vol. 305. no. 5692, pp. 1918 - 1921
DOI: 10.1126/science.1103581


Perspectives
BIOMEDICINE:
A Fresh Look at BSE
Bruce Chesebro*

snip...

Spontaneous protein misfolding is not a new phenomenon as proteins are known
to sometimes misfold after synthesis. Cells in turn have devised ingenious
ways to deal with this problem. These include molecular chaperone proteins
that bind to misfolded proteins and help them to unfold, and organelles
called proteosomes that degrade misfolded or unwanted proteins. However,
although misfolded prion proteins have been generated in test tubes as well
as in cultured cells, it has been difficult to demonstrate that such
misfolded abnormal prion proteins are infectious (4, 5). Even the most
recent data do not prove conclusively that infectivity has been generated in
vitro because misfolded synthetic prion proteins were not able to transfer
disease directly to wild-type mice (6). To obtain infectivity and subsequent
prion disease, the misfolded proteins had to be inoculated and incubated for
1 to 2 years in transgenic mice that overexpressed a mutant version of the
prion protein. Previous data from this group showed that transgenic mice
expressing high amounts of prion protein developed neurological disease
without inoculation of misfolded prion protein (7). Thus, at the biochemical
level, the critical attributes of the misfolded prion protein required for
infectivity are not known, and misfolding of prion protein alone may not be
sufficient to generate an infectious agent (.
Nevertheless, the idea that BSE might originate due to the spontaneous
misfolding of prion proteins has received renewed interest in the wake of
reports suggesting the occurrence of atypical BSE (9-11). These results
imply that new strains of cattle BSE might have originated separately from
the main UK outbreak. Where and how might such strains have originated?
Although such rare events cannot be studied directly, any number of sources
of the original BSE strain could also explain the discovery of additional
BSE strains in cattle (see the figure). However, it would be worrisome if
spontaneous BSE were really a valid etiology because such a mechanism would
be impossible to prevent--unlike other possible scenarios that could be
controlled by large-scale eradication of TSE-positive animals.

Another way to look at this problem is to examine evidence for possible
spontaneous TSE disease in other animals besides cattle. Spontaneous BSE
would be extremely difficult to detect in cattle, where horizontal spread is
minimal. However, in the case of the sheep TSE disease, scrapie, which
spreads from ewes to lambs at birth as well as between adults, spontaneous
disease should be detectable as new foci of clinical infection. In the early
1950s scrapie was eradicated in both Australia and New Zealand, and the
mainland of both these countries has remained scrapie-free ever since. This
scrapie-free status is not the result of selection of sheep resistant to
scrapie because sheep from New Zealand are as susceptible as their UK
counterparts to experimental scrapie infection (12). These experiments of
man and nature appear to indicate that spontaneous clinical scrapie does not
occur in sheep. Similarly, because CWD is known to spread horizontally, the
lack of CWD in the deer or elk of eastern North America but its presence in
western regions would also argue against a spontaneous disease mechanism.
This is particularly noteworthy in New Zealand, where there are large
numbers of deer and elk farms and yet no evidence of spontaneous CWD. If
spontaneous scrapie does not occur in sheep or deer, this would suggest that
spontaneous forms of BSE and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) are
unlikely to be found in cattle or humans. The main caveat to this notion is
that spontaneous disease may arise in some animal species but not others. In
humans, sCJD--which is considered by some researchers to begin by
spontaneous misfolding of the prion protein--usually takes more than 50
years to appear. Thus, in animals with a shorter life-span, such as sheep,
deer, and cattle, an analogous disease mechanism might not have time to
develop.

What can we conclude so far about BSE in North America? Is the BSE detected
in two North American cows sporadic or spontaneous or both? "Sporadic"
pertains to the rarity of disease occurrence. "Spontaneous" pertains to a
possible mechanism of origin of the disease. These are not equivalent terms.
The rarity of BSE in North America qualifies it as a sporadic disease, but
this low incidence does not provide information about cause. For the two
reported North American BSE cases, exposure to contaminated MBM remains the
most likely culprit. However, other mechanisms are still possible, including
cross-infection by sheep with scrapie or cervids with CWD, horizontal
transmission from cattle with endemic BSE, and spontaneous disease in
individual cattle. Based on our understanding of other TSEs, the spontaneous
mechanism is probably the least likely. Thus, "idiopathic" BSE--that is, BSE
of unknown etiology--might be a better term to describe the origin of this
malady.

What does all this imply about testing cattle for BSE in North America?
Current testing in the United States indicates that BSE is rare (one
positive result in 40,000 cattle tested).

snip...end

http://www.sciencemag.org/



SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM
1997 TO 2004. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, and that is
with a human TSE surveillance system that is terrible
flawed. in 1997 cases of the _reported_ cases of cjd
were at 54, to 163 _reported_ cases in 2004. see stats
here;

p.s. please note the 47 PENDING CASES to Sept. 2005

p.s. please note the 2005 Prion D. total 120(
8=includes 51 type pending, 1 TYPE UNKNOWN ???

p.s. please note sporadic CJD 2002(1) 1=3 TYPE UNKNOWN???

p.s. please note 2004 prion disease (6) 6=7 TYPE
UNKNOWN???


http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html





Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518